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Chief Justices I Never Knew
By WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST*
To law students, law teachers, and the bar at large, the Supreme

Court of the United States is thought of as consisting of nine members.
While one of them is called the chief justice and presides over the
Court while it is in session, lawyers and sophisticated laymen know perfectly well that his vote in conference counts no more than that of the
most junior associate justice. He is generally considered, as the prime
minister of Great Britain once was, to be primus inter pares-first
among equals-taking precedence only because any group must have
a nominal leader.
Although his vote carries no more weight than that of his
colleagues, the chief justice undoubtedly influences the Court and its
decisions. When a new chief justice accedes to the bench, newspaper
editorials often suggest that by either his "executive" or his "administrative" ability he will somehow "bring the Court together" and eliminate the squabbling and bickering thought to be reflected in decisions
of important issues by a sharply divided Court. The power to calm
such naturally troubled waters is usually beyond the capacity of any
mortal chief justice. He presides over a conference not of eight subordinates, whom he may direct or instruct, but of eight associates who,
like him, have tenure during good behavior, and who are as
independent as hogs on ice. He may at most persuade or cajole them.
This point is illustrated by an anecdote about Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes. He was meticulous in his desire that the Court,
which then convened at noon, come through the red velour curtains
at the very stroke of the hour. On several occasions, however, the
senior associate, Mr. Justice McReynolds, had barely made it to the
robing room in time. On one particular day the hour of noon was almost
at hand, and Mr. Justice McReynolds had not yet appeared. The chief
justice dispatched one of his messengers to Justice McReynolds'
chambers to importune him to hurry. The messenger returned a
*
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moment or two later, but without Mr. Justice McReynolds. The chief
justice asked the messenger if he had communicated the message to
Mr. Justice McReynolds, and the messenger replied that he had. To
the chief justice's next question the messenger replied, "He said to tell
you that he doesn't work for you."
The influence of the eight associate justices is largely limited to
their discussion of and vote on the cases that come before the conference, and to the opinions they write either for the Court or in dissent.
It is quite otherwise with the chief justice. He has a number of responsibilities which, though they may appear peripheral to the casual
observer, can be of substantial importance to the work of the Court,
and indeed, to the nation as a whole.
In order to avoid making my remarks unnecessarily abstract, I
would like to touch briefly upon the careers of John Marshall
and Roger Taney, who presided over the Court for a consecutive period of sixty-three years in the nineteenth century, and of
William Howard Taft, Charles Evans Hughes, and Harlan F. Stone,
who presided over the Court for the much shorter period of twentyfive years in the twentieth century.
A glance at even the most perfunctory biographical sketches of
these five individuals reveals that not one was, by any means, a stranger
to politics at the time of his appointment. I suspect there is general
agreement with the notion that judges, once appointed to the bench,
should be divorced from partisan politics. Some would carry this
notion further and suggest that the process of judicial selection should
not be tainted by politics at all: even before the judge ascends to the
bench, if that be the proper verb, he should have no connection with
politics. Not only is this notion inaccurate, but I do not believe that
it is a norm for which we should strive.
There is an old aphorism with respect to the federal judiciary: if
you "scratch a federal judge you will find a former politician."
Whether or not this is true of the entire federal judiciary, its truth
certainly extends to a large number of the associate justices, past and
present, of the Supreme Court. It can fairly be said of the five chief
justices I have mentioned that before they donned their robes they
were not only politicians, but heavily engaged at one time or another
in important partisan politics.
My purpose in going into this matter is not to furnish you thumbnail biographical sketches of five of the chief justices, since I am certain
that you have available to you far better sources; but rather to draw
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two conclusions. First, the extensive careers in public life of each of
these five chief justices were not unrelated to their appointments; and,
second, it may well be that the office of chief justice of the United
States calls for skills and abilities more readily honed in the give and
take of political life than in the practice and teaching of the law. The
chief justice not only casts one of nine votes in the decision of each
case argued before the Court; but he presides over both the open
sessions of the Court, during which oral argument is heard, and over
the closed sessions of the Court's conference. Following deliberation
and voting at these conferences of the Court he assigns to one of the
associates or to himself the task of writing the opinion to support the
result reached by the majority.1 In addition to his purely judicial duties,
the chief justice is frequently the spokesman for the Court or even for
the entire judiciary. His opinions receive greater coverage in the
press than those of an associate justice of the Court, or of a judge of
any other court. On rare occasions, it may fall his lot to mastermind
the defense of the Supreme Court as an institution. He must be not
only a jurist, but interlocutor of the judicial minstrel show, a planner,
and occasionally a statesman. Surely training in the rough and tumble
of politics is no hindrance to the performance of these tasks.
John Marshall had been, successively: a Federalist congressman
from Virginia; one of President Adams' envoys in the "XYZ" negotiations with France; and secretary of state, the office he held when
nominated by President Adams to be chief justice of the Supreme
Court. Although when appointed he was perhaps a more moderate
Federalist than some of his cohorts in that party, while still a Richmond
lawyer he had been a strong advocate of Federalist principles. His
position as chief justice thus made him the natural focal point for the
struggle of the newly victorious Jeffersonian Republicans, who put their
philosophy into practice. Additionally, Jefferson and Marshall, though
distant cousins, were bitter enemies personally, politically, and philosophically. During the eight years in which one was chief justice and
the other president the hostility between them was only thinly
disguised.
John Marshall served as chief justice for thirty-four years, dying
in office at the age of eighty-one in 1835.2 To succeed him, President
Andrew Jackson appointed Roger B. Taney of Maryland, who was even
1. When the chief justice votes with the minority in conference, the assignment
of the opinion falls to the senior associate who voted with the majority.
2. It is interesting to note parenthetically that of all the chief justices from John
Marshall to Fred Vinson, all but one-Charles Evans Hughes-died in office.
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less a stranger to partisan politics than Marshall had been. Taney had
been Jackson's right hand man in the latter's celebrated war with the
Bank of the United States, serving Jackson as both attorney general
and as secretary of the treasury. While attorney general, Taney had
advised Jackson that it was within his authority as president to withdraw
all funds of the United States on deposit in the Bank of the United
States. Following this advice, Jackson instructed his secretary of the
treasury to withdraw the deposit-the latter refused. Jackson then
removed the secretary of the treasury, appointed Taney in his place,
and Taney withdrew the deposits. As a result of the heated controversy between the president and Congress that surrounded these
actions, the Senate tabled Jackson's nomination of Taney as an associate justice of the Supreme Court in 1834 so Taney never took his seat.
The intervening congressional elections, however, had strengthened
the Jacksonian forces, and Taney's nomination as chief justice encountered much less opposition.
John Marshall and his court encountered rough waters at the beginning of his term, their difficulties gradually subsiding. Unfortunately, Taney and his court encountered their roughest waters during
the last days of Taney's tenure as chief justice. The Dred Scott decision, an opinion of the Court written by Taney in 1857, plunged the
Court into a maelstrom of bitter recriminations from which it would
not recover for a generation. This decision was a prominent subject
of debate during the 1860 presidential campaign that resulted in
Abraham Lincoln's election to succeed James Buchanan. When Taney
swore Lincoln in as president on March 4, 1861, he was eighty-four
years of age, and the triumphant Republicans were certain that the
natural laws of attrition would give Lincoln an opportunity to appoint
a new chief justice during his first term as president. But 1864 found
Taney, though ill, still presiding over the Court. The disappointment
of the Republicans was pungently, if indelicately, expressed in a story
attributed to the president pro tern of the Senate, radical Republican
Ben Wade of Ohio:
[O]lid Ben said he had for many weary years earnestly prayed that
the author of the Dred Scott decision might live until a Republican President could name his successor-and he began to fear that
he prayed too hard.3
He had not, however, overdone it: Taney died later that year. After
some deliberation, Lincoln selected Salmon P. Chase, his former secre3. 2 C. WAREN, THE
(1926).
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tary of the treasury, as the new chief justice. Chase's three immediate
successors were Morrison R. Waite, Melville W. Fuller, and Edward
Douglass White. Upon the latter's death in 1921, President Iarding
appointed William Howard Taft as chief justice. Alpheus Mason, in
his work The Supreme Court from Taft to Warren, described Taft's
career in these terms:
The biography of William Howard Taft is amazing both for
length of public service (1880 to 1930) and for the variety of his
activities: public prosecutor, solicitor-general, district and federal circuit judge, Cabinet member and administrator, President
of the United States, law school dean, professor of law, and
Chief Justice of the United States. 4
During his relatively brief tenure as chief justice,5 Taft used the
influence of his office in several ways. He wished to "mass" the Court,
to subdue or prevent dissent, and to give the impression of unanimity
or near unanimity in the opinions. The Court was at that time (as
it has been almost constantly since) divided on important constitutional
issues. Taft preferred the doctrine of substantive due process that
favored the Court's review of economic regulatory legislation to make
certain that it did not infringe upon property or contract rights thought
to be protected by the Constitution. He would invite members of the
Court allied with him on these issues to his home for Sunday afternoon
discussions that were, in fact, extracurricular rump conferences devoted
to outmaneuvering the minority faction on the Court." His correspondence reveals that he did not hesitate to urge new appointees to
the Court to join the majority, and to repress any desires they might
have to express their views in separate opinions.'
,By all accounts, Taft's personality was congenial. Those of his
associates who disagreed with him, as well as those who agreed with
him, testified to his success in making the conference discussions as
pleasant as possible. Both Holmes and Brandeis commented on his
ability to make conferences less emotionally tiring and physically
exhausting than they had been under his predecessor, Chief Justice
White.8
During the first years of Taft's service as chief justice, liberals such
as Holmes and Brandeis often appeared to acquiesce in decisions with
4. A.

MASON, THE SuPREm Court 5Rom TAFT To WARREN

after cited as MASON].

5. Taft was chief justice for nine years only, until 1930.
6. MASON, supra note 4, at 70.

7. Id. at 65.
8. Id. at 60-61.

42 (1968) [herein-
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which they might not have been in complete agreement. 9 Part of this
atmosphere may have been due to Taft's practice in assigning opinions
-a practice that was generous to a fault, according to Justice Stone,
who became the junior associate justice during Taft's tenure. Taft
would parcel out the more desirable opinions among the associates,
frequently retaining the least desirable ones for himself. 10
During his tenure as chief justice, Taft took a tremendous interest
in the functioning of the federal judiciary as a whole. He apparently
intervened quite actively with the president and the attorney general
in connection with their selection of nominees, not only for associate
justiceships on the Supreme Court, but for vacancies on the district
courts and the courts of appeals.
Chief Justice Taft, so- far as I know, has not made anybody's list
of the ten, or even of the twenty, greatest members of the Supreme
Court. His writing style was not particularly lucid, and many of the
constitutional doctrines that he espoused have not withstood the test
of time. Yet as an arbiter at the conference table, and perhaps more
importantly, as a man who felt a great responsibility for the overall
functioning of the federal judicial system, with the ability to do
something about it, he was by no means an insignificant chief justice.
Nor was his successor, Charles Evans Hughes. I again resort to
Mason's work for a thumbnail description of Hughes' career:
Charles Evans Hughes is, by any standard, one of the most important and truly national public figures of this century. His life
represents not one but at least eight careers: law teacher and
eminent lawyer, feared and fearless investigator, crusading governor, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Republican Presidential candidate-and near winner-in the 1916 race for the
Presidency . . . , Secretary of State,
World Court judge, and
1
Chief Justice of the United States.
Almost fifteen years intervened between Hughes' resignation as
an associate justice and his appointment as chief justice. Compared
to the opinions he wrote as an associate justice, Hughes' later opinions
read better the first time through than they do upon a second or third
reading. His style gives the impression that the law marches through
the pages of the opinion to its inexorable conclusion; that there simply
is no other way the case could have come out. The result of a style
9. Id. at 61.

10. Id. at 68-69 n.82, citing letter from H.F. Stone to Marshall and Lauson Stone,
Nov. 24, 1939 (Stone Papers, MSS Lm. CoNG.).
11. Id. at 83-84.
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that conveys such magisterial overtones and conviction is frequently to
obscure the genuinely difficult questions in a case.
I would by no means suggest that such a style is not perfectly
permissible, nor even that a style that does not achieve the advantages
of Hughes' magisterial progression may not also encounter all of its
drawbacks. I would suggest that writing a judicial opinion for a
nine person court is a very different task from composing an article
or treatise on the subject for a single individual. When you write for
the Court, you speak not only for yourself but for at least four other
members of the Court, each of whom understandably has his own way
of expressing an idea. While of necessity much latitude is given to
the opinion writer, there are inevitable compromises. Labeled by critics
as due to confusion or lack of logical perception, these compromises
may in fact be simply a very necessary effort to avoid deciding an issue
that might seem to some to be inextricably entwined with those issues
which are decided in the opinion.
A knowledgeable commentator has described Hughes' technique
in the following words:
He approached his own opinions with his usual meticulous care,
turning out innumerable drafts in order to be certain of the most
correct and precise language. But he had no particular pride of
authorship, and if in order to secure a vote ,he was forced to put
in some disconnected or disjointed thoughts or sentences, in they
went and
12 let the law schools concern themselves with what they
meant.
Hughes also had the misfortune, if it may be called that, of being
chief justice at a time when the Court was sorely torn from within by
philosophical divisions among its members, and subjected to a frontal
assault from without by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The criticism
that his opinions during his eleven year tenure as chief justice may not
have been entirely consistent with one another, and that he may have
bent with the winds of change in order that the institution might not
break, should be made only after the most careful examination of the
circumstances in which he acted.
Professor Freund has noted' that Charles Evans Hughes was
masterful when presiding over the open sessions of the Court during
oral argument.'" Those who sat on the bench with him and those who
practiced before him have echoed this sentiment. Justice Frankfurter
12. McElwain, The Business of the Supreme Court as Conducted by Chief Justice

Hughes, 63 HAv. L. Rnv. 5, 19 (1949).
13. Freund, Charles Evans Hughes as Chief Justice, 81 HAuv. L. Rav. 4, 13

(1967).
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observed of Hughes that he did not exert authority, "he radiated it."' 4
Robert H. Jackson, who argued many controversial cases to the Hughes
Court before he himself became an associate justice, commented:
Even when passions were running high and his own associates
were in sharp division, he never lost his poise. He was -an ideal
presiding judge. 15
But the role of the chief justice in presiding over the closed
conference sessions can be of even greater importance than his role
in presiding over the open sessions. When he presided over the
conference Hughes was, from almost every account, admirable. Such
diverse personalities as Owen Roberts, Robert H. Jackson, Felix
Frankfurter, and William 0. Douglas have commented that he was
without peer in discharging this responsibility.
Justice Frankfurter, speaking at the University of Virginia twentyodd years ago, described Hughes' performance in these words:
I've often used a word which for me best expresses the atmosphere
that Hughes generated; it was taut ....
Hughes was dynamic and efficient. That's a bad word to
apply to Hughes, because it implies regimentation. It implies
something disagreeable, at least to me. I don't like to have a
man who is too efficient. He's likely to be not human enough.
That wasn't true of Hughes. He simply was effective-not efficient, but effective . . . . It has been said that there wasn't free
and easy talk in Hughes's day in the conference -room. Nothing
could be further from the truth. There was less wasteful talk.
There was less repetitious talk. There was less foolish talk. You
just didn't like to talk unless you were dead sure of your ground,
because that gimlet mind of his was there ahead of you.1 6
Hughes' colleague for eleven years, Justice Owen Roberts, described
Hughes' methods at conference in these words:
His presentation of the facts of a case was full and impartial. His
summary of the legal questions arising out of the facts was equally
complete, dealing with the opposing contentions so as to make
them stand out clearly. When this had been done, he would
usually look up with a quizzical smile and say, "Now I will state
where I come out," and would then outline what he thought the
decision of the Court should be. Again in many cases his treatment was so complete that little, if anything, further could be added
by any of the Justices. In close and difficult cases, where there
were opposing views, the discussion would go round the table from
14. Frankfurter, "The Administrative Side" of Chief Justice Hughes, 63 H&Rv. L.
REV. 1, 4 (1949).
15. Jackson, The Judicial Career of Chief Justice Hughes, 27 A.B.A.J. 408, 411
(1941).
16. Frankfurter, Chief Justices I Have Known, 39 VA. L. REv. 883, 902-03
(1953).
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the senior to the junior, each stating his views and the reasons for
his concurrence or his difference with those outlined by the Chief.
After the Chief Justice had finished his statement of the case and
others took up the discussion, I have never known him to interrupt
or to get into an argument with the Justice who was speaking .... 27
In 1941, Charles Evans Hughes retired, and Franklin Roosevelt
appointed Associate Justice Harlan F. Stone to succeed him as chief
justice. A strong case can, and indeed, has been made by Professor
Mason, Stone's very able biographer, that Stone's opinions throughout
his tenure on the Court-from 1925 until 1946-were both analytically
more sound and doctrinally more consistent than those of Chief Justice
Hughes. 8 These two chief justices also differed significantly in their
manner of presiding over the Court's conference-in the opinion of
most knowledgeable observers, Stone's performance does not compare
favorably with that of Hughes. Professor Mason approvingly cites
Warner Gardner's evaluation of Justice Stone as a "careful and wise
judge. . . ,,"19 but then goes on to say that
[a]s Chief Justice, Stone was less impressive . . . . The bench
Stone headed was the most frequently divided, the most openly
quarrelsome in history. If success be measured by the Chief's
ability to
maintain the appearanceof harmony, he certainly was a
20
failure.

Stone had by far the least political experience prior to coming to the
Court of any of the five chief justices being discussed. This contrast
is particularly striking between Stone, on the one hand, and Hughes
and Taft on the other. To me a plausible conclusion is that Hughes'
superiority to Stone in presiding over the conference has a definite
connection to their different amount of exposure to active political life.
When Hughes was presiding, the conference finished its weekly
business in sessions lasting roughly from four to six hours. When Stone
presided, the same amount of business often took two or three days
to complete. Justice Frankfurter in his diary entry for Tuesday, March
9, 1943, said:
The long hours of our Conferences seem to me a very bad way
of doing business -that we have to do, and I am greatly disturbed
about the future if the Chief does not make it a flat rule to terminate Conferences after four hours .... 21
17. 2 M. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 675 (1951), quoting Justice Roberts' memorial address before the New York Bar, Dec. 12, 1948.
18. MASON, supra note 4, at 113, 131.
19. Id. at 169, citing Gardner, Mr. Chief Justice Stone, 59 HAiY. L. REv. 1203,
1208 (1946).
20. Id. at 169-70.
21. J. LASH, FROm Tmn DIMuS OF FEUX FkUrTER 207 (1975).
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In another passage from the same diary, Frankfurter comments:
[T]here followed what is in danger of becoming a habit with the
C[hief] J[ustice], of not allowing a Justice to state his views uninterruptedly when contrary to those of the C[hief) J[ustice] but to
argue almost every word that is uttered, thereby breaking up the
discussion and making of it a needless contention, and, of course,
causing a frightful -waste of time. Several of the Brethren, especially Roberts and Black, have talked to me complainingly of
this. When, last year, Lauson Stone, the Chief's oldest son, asked
me confidentially how his Dad was carrying on as C.J., I told him
that I had only one qualification to make, and that is precisely
the practice of which today's performance was an egregious example, namely, his failure -to observe what seems to me to be
an indispensably wise order of procedure-for the C.J. to have
his say, and then in order of seniority, for every other member
of the Court to have his say without any interruption.2 2
An able and informed critic of the Court urges that Stone's virtues
are preferable to those of Hughes. When issues of great moment are
pending before the conference, the rule should be full and free debate,
even if it takes several days to decide the eight, ten, or twelve cases
that are before the conference. 2
This proposition is undoubtedly meritorious, but having participated in -the conferences of the Court for slightly more than four
years now, I wigh to dissent from it. Certainly conference discussion
should not be throttled. Even the most junior justice should be given
the impression that he is entitled to make the fullest statements of his
views. But the realistic alternatives are not gag rule or full and free
discussion. Instead, the choice is between orderly, relevant discussion,
on the one hand, and stream of consciousness reflections or seriatim
lectures, on the other. Indeed, a give and take discussion between
nine normal human beings, in which each participates equally, is not
feasible. Even between two or three persons, such exchanges can get
out of hand. Yet few people can muster the patience to sit still to
receive in silence eight verbal -broadsides, each lasting from ten to
fifteen minutes, and each reflecting the speaker's analysis of the fine
points of the case at issue. Even the most patient of listeners would
find himself towards the end of such a performance champing at the
bit to begin his turn at dishing it out rather than receiving it. I can
speak with experience on this score, since for four years I have sat in
the conference in the position of its junior member, doing more than
my share of champing at the bit waiting for my turn.
22. Id. at 160.
23. Frank, Book Review, 9 SrAN. L. Rav. 621, 629 n.31 (1957).
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Furthermore, if the purpose of the 'conference is to influence the
final decision, seriatim lectures are entirely ineffectual. The conference is less often than expected the forum in which the Court's critically important cases are actually decided. Each of the justices will
have prepared himself, hopefully, on the critical issues in such a case
by reading briefs, listening to oral argument, reading cases, talking to
law clerks, and simply pondering. The preparation process itself tends
to invite not an absolute, knife-edged neutrality, but rather a preference, at least tentative, for one side of the case or the other. When
nine justices thus prepared assemble around the conference table on
Friday morning to decide an important case presenting constitutional
questions that they have all debated and written about before, the
outcome may be a -foregone conclusion. In such a case only a truly
insightful and concise contribution may provoke a change of mind-a
stream of rhetoric which begins with the laws of the Medes and the
Persians and slowly works forward in time is a wasted effort.
By virtue of his own preparation and economy of statement,
Charles Evans Hughes presided magisterially and yet without offending
the brethren. Stone, on the other hand, though an extraordinarily able
lawyer and excellent writer of opinions, had less sensitivity for the
different kinds of responsibilities associated with presiding over the
conference. If the chief justice conceives his role to be akin to that
of the presiding officer at a political convention, who can always grab
the microphone away from the opposition when necessary, he will
create resentment without actually advancing the cause that he
champions. Justice Cardozo has written that "the sovereign virtue for
the judge is clearness, ' 24 and most members of the profession would
agree with him. The chief justice has a notable advantage over his
brethren: he states the case first, and analyzes the law governing it first.
If he cannot, with this advantage, maximize the impact of his views,
subsequent interruptions of colleagues or digressions on his part or by
others will not succeed either. Theodore Roosevelt described the
presidency as a "bully pulpit." The chief. justice, as president of the
conference, occupies no such position.
Another disadvantage of endless conference discussions is the
very visible tension which prolonged dispute, even of the most friendly
kind, engenders among nine justices deciding cases of great significance both to themselves and to the country. It is at least in part
due to our training as lawyers that the conference at all times since
24. Cardozo, Law and Literature, 48 YALE LJ. 489, 491 (1939).

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 3

I have been a member has been the cordial group that it is. An attorney learns to contest hotly a case in the courtroom and, after court
adjourns, to go out for a drink with his opponent. In my own experience, one can discuss a case with one's law clerks, or in a law school
seminar, or a continuing legal education program for an hour or more
without any visible intellectual drain. But if the decision of the court
of last resort hinges on the outcome of the discussion, an entirely new
dimension in terms of frustration, irritability, and tension is added as
the discussion becomes prolonged.
Harlan Stone and Felix Frankfurter had notorious reputations for
championing their own views at great length. That they nonetheless
apparently failed, in spite of their very notable abilities, to win many
converts in conference supports the conclusion that the power of persuasion is a subtle skill, dependent on quality rather than quantity.
I have thus far adverted to the role of the chief justice as the
officer presiding over the Court in open session, as assignor of cases,
and as the leader of conference discussions. Perhaps more important
than any of these roles, however, is that of the chief justice as
spokesman for the Court in nonjudicial matters. I would first like to
mention Chief Justice Taft's contribution in this regard, then I will
discuss in a little more detail the reactions of Chief Justice Marshall and
Chief Justice Hughes to political assaults on the Court from other
branches of government.
As I have earlier indicated, Chief Justice Taft has not gone down
in the annals of the Court as one of its great luminaries. But in my
opinion his contribution to the structure of the federal judicial system
is immeasurable. His very active part in shepherding through
Congress, with the help of Justices Van Devanter and Brandeis, the
Jurisdictional Act of 1925,5 entitles him to a high place among judicial
statesmen. This law abrogated the obligation of the Supreme Court
of the United States to hear certain cases without regard to their lack
of significant national importance, and made its docket almost entirely
discretionary. I think it fair to say that this Act of 1925 alone has
enabled the Supreme Court of the United States to survive the second
and third quarters of this century. Without it the Court would be
completely inundated by cases that it would by law be required to
decide on the merits, the volume of which would be simply beyond
its capacity.
Chief Justice Taft foresaw the need for this grant of discretionary
25. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936.
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jurisdiction before it became indispensable. It is due to his foresight
and to his willingness to perform tasks outside of the normal business
of the Court that the Supreme Court today is as currently abreast of
its docket as it is.
The Court throughout its history has needed not only chief justices
who built for the future, but chief justices who were willing to
defend it against attack from without. The two principal assaults
against the Court occurred during the administrations of Presidents
Thomas Jefferson and Franklin Delano Roosevelt. During, the
Jefferson era the House of Representatives voted to impeach Supreme
Court Justice Samuel Chase, who was then tried before the Senate.
During his administration, President Roosevelt proposed to, in his
words, "reorganize" the Court; or, in the words of his opponents, to
"pack" the Court. Both of these situations posed very real and very
dangerous threats to the Supreme Court as an independent instituti6n.
When the Court finds itself in such a situation, or, more specifically, when the chief justice finds the Court in such a situation, he has
no rules to guide him. At this juncture he is, in the public eye,
a spokesman for the institution, no longer bound by the ordinary rules
applicable to official Court proceedings. Certainly the conduct of the
chief justice in such situations is a test of his ability. A comparison
of John Marshall's reaction to Chase's impeachment to the reaction of
Charles Evans Hughes to Franklin Roosevelt's plan to pack the Court
is instructive.
Associate Justice Samuel Chase was tried in February, 1805,
before the United States Senate on a charge brought against him by
the House of Representatives. At this time the Supreme Court was
a fledgling institution, bearing out Alexander Hamilton's observation
in FederalistPaper No. 78 that it was the "least dangerous" branch.2 6
Thus many observers believed that if the Jeffersonian faction in Congress should succeed in removing one of the associate justices by impeachment and conviction the same fate might well lie in store for
every other appointee of a Federalist president. Charles Warren, a
leading historian of the Supreme Court, summarized the effect such
a course of events would have had upon this institution:
[The Republican leaders] contended that impeachment must be
considered a means of keeping the Courts in reasonable harmony
26. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 504 (Mittell ed. 1938) (A. Hamilton). The seeds
of the Court's later claim to equality, if not primacy among the branches had been sown
only two years earlier in Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch)
137 (1803).
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with the will of the.Nation, as expressed through Congress and the
Executive, and that a judicial decision declaring an Act of Congress unconstitutional would support an impeachment and the
removal of a Judge, who thus constituted
27 himself an instrument
of opposition to the course of government.
Marshall's only public participation in these proceedings was his
appearance as a witness in the Senate trial. Marshall's very sympathetic biographer, Albert Beveridge, says: "Friendly eyewitnesses
record that the Chief Justice appeared to be frightened . ..."I
A Federalist senator by no means sympathetic with the
Jeffersonians recorded in his diary that:
John Marshall is the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States. I was much better pleased with the manner in
which his Brother testified than with him.
The Chief Justice really discovered too much caution-too
much fear-too much cunning-He ought to have been more
bold-frank [and] explicit than he was.
There was in his manner an evident disposition to accommodate the Managers. That dignified frankness which his high
office requires did not appear. A cunning man ought never to
discover the art of the trimmerin his testimony. 29
Marshall's testimony simply went to his knowledge of Virginia
practice and procedure, and to his observation of Chase's conduct of
a trial conducted in Richmond. It is doubtful that Marshall's testimony
played any significant part in the Senate's ultimate decision to acquit
Chase, but the impression he made during his testimony is not one of
the brighter spots in his public career. The judgment of history has
been that the acquittal of Justice Chase provided vital and necessary
support for an independent judiciary, yet the chief justice of the Supreme Court decided to hunker down before the political storm that
appeared to be brewing.
Charles Evans Hughes, on the other hand, showed himself to be
a master strategist for the Court when its independence was once again
threatened by President Franklin Roosevelt's court-packing plan in
1937. The Supreme Court, from approximately the beginning of
Chief Justice Taft's term in 1921, had been increasingly asserting its
authority to review state economic legislation designed to alleviate the
lot of the working class. The Court attempted to ascertain whether
that legislation deprived employers and businessmen of the "freedom
27. 1 C. WAEmmN, THE SUPRE E COURT ix UNrED STATEs HIsTORY 293 (1926).
28. 3 A. BEvERDGE, THE LiFE oF JoHN MARSHALL 192 (1919).
29. Id. at 196, quoting 2 PLmiER, DIARY, PLUMER Mss L. CONG. (Feb.

1805).
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of contract" thought to be embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment.
During the presidencies of Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover, when
Congress passed little innovative legislation, the Court invalidated a
considerable amount of state legislation, but very few acts of Congress.
With the election of President Roosevelt in 1932, however, the country
witnessed a dramatic expansion in the role of the federal government.
Congress, in the exercise of its power under the commerce clause,
enacted laws regulating many phases of the nation's economy. When
challenges to this legislation reached the Supreme Court in 1935 and
1936, it invalidated a number of the laws. The president's reaction was
foreseeable. At a press conference shortly after one of the decisions
he denounced the Supreme Court for taking the country back to the
horse-and-buggy days.
After his landslide re-election victory in 1936, Roosevelt's first
order of business was to devise a plan to bring the Court into line. In
early February, 1937, he proposed a law, drafted by Attorney General
Homer Cummings, providing that for each justice on the Court who
had attained the age of seventy but had not retired, the president would
be entitled to appoint an additional justice. Since six of the nine
justices on the Court at that time were over seventy, if the law had
passed the president would have beenempowered to appoint six additional justices.
The arguments first advanced by the administration for the enactment of the bill did not reveal -the real reason for it-that the administration believed the Court was using an archaic and unjustified
constitutional doctrine to frustrate the attempt of the people's elected
representatives in Congress to deal with a national emergency. The
justification urged instead was that the Court, with so many superannuated justices, was unable to keep current with its docket. It became
apparent during the first month after the plan was unveiled that this
explanation would not wash either with Congress or with the public.
Therefore the president, in a speech delivered early in March, 1937,
figuratively took off the glove and made plain his real reasons for advancing the plan:
The Court in addition to the proper use of its judicial functions
had improperly set itself up -as a third House of the Congressa super-legislature, as one of the Justices has called it-reading into
the Constitution words and implications which are not there, and
which were never intended to be there.
We have, therefore, reached the point as a Nation where
we must take action to save the Constitution from the Court and
the Court from itself. We must find a way to take an appeal
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from the Supreme Court to the Constitution itself. We want a
Supreme Court which will do justice under the Constitution-not
over it. In our courts we want a government of laws and not
of men.
During the past half century the balance of power between the
three great branches of the Federal Government has been tipped out
of balance by the Court in direct contradiction of the high purposes
of the framers of the constitution. It is my purpose to restore that
balance. You who know me will accept my solemn assurance that
in a world in which democracy is under attack, I seek to make
American democracy succeed.3 0
As a result of the 1936 electoral landslide, the Republican minorities in the House of Representatives and the Senate were so small
that they could barely impede the passage of the legislation, let alone
defeat it, by themselves. The Republican leadership therefore agreed
that Republicans would remain in the background, and that Democratic
legislators who opposed the plan would lead the attack upon it. In
the Senate, where the bill's first trial was to take place, the leader of
the opposition was Senator Burton K. Wheeler of Montana. His
liberal credentials were impeccable, since he had been a long time supporter of reform legislation and had run as a vice presidential candidate
on the LaFollette Independent presidential ticket in 1924.
Senator Wheeler was scheduled to testify as the opening witness
for the opposition before the Senate Judiciary Commitee on Monday,
March 22, 1937. A three-man delegation representing the senators
opposed to the bill called on the chief justice on the preceding
Thursday, and asked him to appear personally and testify before the
committee. He was willing to do so, but only to rebut -thepresident's
charge that the Court was behind in its work. Hughes wanted Justice
Brandeis, a respected member of the liberal wing of the Court, to appear with him, but the latter strenuously objected to a personal
appearance by either or both of them before the committee. Brandeis
felt their presence would improperly involve the Court in a political
issue. Brandeis did, however, agree with Hughes that it would be
proper for the chief justice to send Wheeler a letter, to be read before
the Judiciary Committee, outlining the facts from the Court's point of
view.
Wheeler, apparently still uncertain as to what to do, finally called
30. R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JuDcIAL SUPREMACY 344-45, 351 (1941).
Franklin Roosevelt's "fireside chats" were magnificent examples of partisan political oratory. This short quotation from his speech of March 9, 1937 can convey only partially
the flavor of the occasion and the message.
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upon Justice Brandeis on Saturday, March 20th. Brandeis told him
that if he would ask Hughes for a letter Hughes would oblige.
Wheeler was hesitant to call upon Hughes since he did not know him
personally and had opposed his confirmation as chief justice seven
years earlier. Failing in his attempts to reassure Wheeler, Brandeis
simply picked up the telephone and called Hughes. When Hughes
answered Brandeis handed the receiver to Wheeler. Hughes immediately invited Wheeler to his house where he assured the latter that
he would have a letter in time for presentation to the Judiciary Committee on the following Monday morning. The chief justice assembled
the necessary data, and completed the letter on Sunday, September
21st. He took it to Justice Brandeis and Justice Van Devanter, and
each reviewed and approved its contents. "Wheeler called at the
Hughes home for the letter late Sunday afternoon. 'The baby is born,'
said the Chief Justice with a broad smile as he put the letter into
Wheeler's hand."31
The letter was the piece de resistance of Senator Wheeler's
testimony before the Senate Judiciary Commitee. Its effect was devastating. The chief justice had taken up and factually rebutted, one by
one, each of the administration's claims of incompetence on the Court.
The letter itself has been described by Hughes' principal biographer
as "cool, judicial, and factual,"3 " as the following excerpts prove:
The Supreme Court is fully abreast of its work. When we rose on
March 15 (for the present recess) we had ,heard argument in cases
in which certiorari had been granted only 4 weeks before-February 15 ....There is no congestion of cases upon our calendar.
This gratifying condition has obtained for several years. We
have been able for several terms 33to adjourn after disposing of all
cases which are ready to be heard.
Hughes then addressed the administration's contention that fifteen
justices would be able to transact more business than the present nine:
An increase in the number of Justices of the Supreme Court, apart
from any question of policy, which I do not discuss, would not
promote the efficiency of the Court. It is believed that it would
impair that efficiency so long as the Court acts as a unit. There
would be more judges to hear, more judges to confer, more judges
to discuss, more judges to be convinced and to decide.3 4
The proponents of the court-packing plan can best testify to the
ultimate success of the chief justice's letter. Almost to a man they
31.

2 M. PusEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 755 (1951).

32. Id. at 756.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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conceded that it had been the most lethal weapon in the hands of their
adversaries. The old "curmudgeon," Secretary of the Interior Harold
L. Ickes, said:
The whole world knows that, while at first it appears that the
President would be strong enough to carry his reform through
Congress, he was outmaneuvered in the end, largely by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes.
Robert H. Jackson, one of the president's principal lieutenants in
the court-packing fight, expressed similar views, as recounted by his
biographer:
Chief Justice Hughes's handling of the fight was "masterly," to use
Jackson's own characterization. Jackson later said to the President, "The old man
put it over on you," a fact which Roosevelt
always conceded.86
Hughes has been criticized for not convening the full Court to
discuss thQ propriety of his drafting this famous letter. When he
brought the matter up at conference following the release of the letter
not a single member disapproved. Subsequently, however, Justice
Stone did voice his objections to Hughes's action, and observed that
Justice Cardozo shared his sentiments. To the extent that the letter
expressly gave the impression that all of the justices agreed with all
of the statements it contained, Hughes undoubtedly erred since he had
consulted only Justices Brandeis and Van Devanter. But in responding
on extremely short notice to a request for help from a group of senators
who were fighting what appeared to be at the time a losing battle to
save the independence of the Court, I believe he acted in a truly
statesmanlike way.
Of course, as Stone later observed, Hughes could have quickly
convened the Court, which was in recess, either at his home or at the
Court, to discuss an appropriate response to Senator Wheeler's request.
But until one has sat in a conference of nine judges and heard them
35. Id. at 766.
36. E. GER-ART, AMnRIcA's ADvocATE: ROBERT H. JACKSON 117 (1958).

Jackson
was one of Roosevelt's ablest lieutenants in the executive branch and was certainly not
disposed to underestimate the president in comparison to the chief justice: "Charles
Evans Hughes was one of the two great personalities of my time. The other was the
President. Purely apart from their abilities or attainments, merely as personalities, they
outshone every other presence. They were quite different, but when they were together,
as I saw them on several occasions when the Court called upon the President and as
Solicitor General I accompanied them, one saw two magnificent but very different
types. The Chief Justice had an external severity that contrasted with the President's
external urbanity. But he was one of the kindest men, and no person who saw him
preside over the Supreme Court will ever have any other standard of perfection in a presiding officer." Id. at 145-46.
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discuss seriatim what they believe would be a proper response or a
proper action in an area in which the Court is unaccustomed to acting,
one does not realize the extraordinary difficulty in obtaining any sort
of agreement. Given the shortness of time, the fact that the letter itself
was over seven pages long, and -that in all probability all of the
remaining members of the Court would not have acquiesced to it in
its entirety, it seems to me that Hughes saw what he had to do and
did it. Perhaps his action was marginally deficient in giving an unwarranted impression of unanimity, but his responsibility as the chief justice
for the independence and integrity of the nation's highest Court supports my assertion that his conduct made him a greater, and not a
lesser, person.
Hughes never had the opportunity to be the judicial innovator that
Marshall did simply because he served as chief justice more than a
century after Marshall did. Perhaps even had he had that opportunity,
he would not have utilized it as magnificently as Marshall did. But
while Hughes must be ranked below Marshall as a jurist, I believe that
he has the strongest claim to be ranked at least the peer of Marshall
in the field of judicial statesmanship.
Conclusion
I have attempted to give you, by means of brief sketches of the
careers of five of the men who have served in that office, some view
of the role which the chief justice can play and has played in
developing and protecting the Supreme Court's place in our federal
system. The chief justice is in many ways merely primus inter pares,
but on occasion he is given the opportunity to strike a blow for the
cause, an opportunity which is simply not accorded to even the most
gifted of his associates. Examination of the manner in which they
make use of these opportunities affords some measurement of the
stature of the men who have sat in the center chair of the Court.

